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Closing Time: Removing the State of Oklahoma
from Alcohol Regulation in Indian Country
The United States Constitution contemplates three types of sovereigns
existing within the country’s borders: the federal government, the states,
and “the Indian tribes.” 1 As to the relationship between the federal
government and the tribes, the Supreme Court determined in 1831 that
tribes constitute “domestic dependent nations,” likening their relationship to
the federal government as “a ward to his guardian.”2 From this language,
the Court eventually held that Congress exercises plenary power over
tribes. But the states do not hold any type of constitutional authority over
tribes. In fact, one year after deeming the tribes as wards to their federal
guardians, the Court established that state law did not apply in tribal
territory. 3
While this point of law has gained some nuance over the years,4 a state’s
ability to impose its laws on a tribe remains subject to “an accommodation
between the interests of the Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one
hand, and those of the State, on the other.” 5 Those determinations generally
come from litigation between states and tribes—not from federal
legislation. But one major exception exists: 18 U.S.C. § 1161. This federal
statute expressly requires that alcohol transactions in Indian country
conform with state alcohol laws. Consequently, in the context of alcohol,
tribes may not enact alcohol laws that conflict with those of the state.
Through 18 U.S.C. § 1161, Congress has allowed state law to bleed into
Indian country and bind tribal sovereigns.
The effects of this statutory scheme are magnified in Oklahoma. The
State of Oklahoma coexists with thirty-eight other sovereigns located
within its borders. 6 And those tribes do more than passively exist. For
example, tribes generate substantial economic impact within the state: a

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”).
2. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
3. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 595 (1832).
4. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561) (“[I]t was ‘long ago’ that ‘the Court departed from Chief Justice
Marshall's view that “the laws of [a State] can have no force” within reservation
boundaries.’”).
5. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156
(1980).
6. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. Reg. 5019, 5019-25 (Jan. 29, 2016).
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2012 study estimated that tribes created $10.8 billion of economic activity, 7
and in 2014, tribal gaming alone accounted for $6.9 billion of economic
impact. 8 Further, over one million acres 9 (and growing) 10 of Indian
country 11 exist within the state, which inevitably leads to jurisdictional
disputes as each sovereign attempts to govern its territory and citizens. In
terms of civil regulatory jurisdiction, the state and tribes have disagreed
over the state’s ability to regulate non-Indians engaged in a number of
activities in Indian country, 12 including alcohol regulation. 13
7. STEVEN C. AGEE ECON. RESEARCH & POLICY INST., OKLA. CITY UNIV., THE
STATEWIDE IMPACTS OF OKLAHOMA TRIBES 15 (2012), https://sovnationcenter.okstate.edu/
sites/default/files/documents/Tribal%20Impact%20Report.pdf.
8. KYLE D. DEAN & MATTHEW S. ROBINSON, OKLA. INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, STATEWIDE
ECONOMIC IMPACTS FROM OKLAHOMA TRIBAL GOVERNMENT GAMING: 2015 ANNUAL IMPACT
REPORT 5 (2015), http://oiga.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/OIGA-2015-Annual-ImpactReport-singlepg.pdf.
9. District II, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://bia.gov/WhoWeAre/BIA/OJS/DOLE/
DistrictII/index.htm (last visited May 12, 2017) (“Of Oklahoma's 77 counties, 63 contain
over a million acres of Indian country trust and restricted land.”).
10. Under section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), tribes may petition
the Secretary of the Interior to convert “fee land to trust status by accepting legal title to the
land in the name of the United States in trust for a tribe or individual Indian.” COHEN'S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 15.07[1][b], at 1041 (Neil Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]. The Supreme Court has held that the IRA land into
trust provision is only available to those tribes under federal jurisdiction at the time of the
IRA’s enactment in 1934. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 391 (2009). The Oklahoma
Indian Welfare Act extended the “rights [and] privileges secured to an organized Indian tribe
under the [IRA]” to tribes within Oklahoma. Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936 § 3, 25
U.S.C. § 5203 (2012) (formerly cited as 25 U.S.C. § 503). Accordingly, tribes within the
state may acquire fee title to land and then have the land converted into trust, making it
Indian country.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (“[T]he term “Indian country”, as used in this chapter,
means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rightsof-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the
borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the
Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through
the same.”).
12. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 453 (1995)
(concerning motor fuels tax and income tax); see also Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 507 (1991) (concerning cigarette taxes).
13. See Chickasaw Nation v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 31 F.3d 964, 966
(10th Cir. 1994) (concerning low-point beer tax), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub
nom. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, vacated in part sub nom.
Chickasaw Nation v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 64 F.3d 577 (10th Cir. 1995); see
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The current alcohol regulatory structure in Indian country warrants
review and revision. By allowing both states and tribes to regulate alcohol
in Indian country, § 1161 clashes with current federal Indian policy. In
direct contrast to the congressional policy of tribal self-governance, tribes
located within Oklahoma are effectively forced by Congress to comply with
the policy decisions of a competing sovereign—the State of Oklahoma.
Congress should remove this barrier and expressly recognize that tribes
may exclusively regulate alcohol in Indian country by virtue of their
inherent sovereignty. Tribes also have a role to play here and should take
affirmative steps to establish the regulatory and remedial procedures
necessary to fully regulate alcohol within Indian country.
While courts have interpreted § 1161, the full scope of the statute
remains ambiguous. Two specific applications (or attempted applications)
of § 1161 demonstrate the external friction caused by this ambiguity: (1)
state taxation of non-Indians in Indian country has led to state-tribal conflict
and (2) attempts to impose civil tort liability (dram-shop liability) 14 on
tribal alcohol transactions has caused disputes between tribes and nonIndian tort claimants.
The answer to easing this friction centers on tribal sovereignty.
Sovereignty necessitates that a government possess the ability to choose its
own policies. But § 1161 stifles tribal sovereignty as tribes remain bound
by state law. To be clear, the argument here is not simply that tribes should
be able to enact more lenient alcohol laws than the state. As sovereigns,
however, tribes are best situated to devise their own alcohol policies,
whatever form they may take. To allow sovereign flexibility, § 1161 should
be amended to reflect inherent tribal sovereignty. Then the surviving issue
of non-Indian alcohol transactions in Indian country may be solved through
cooperative agreements between tribes and the state.

also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Gaming Compact Dispute, Sales Tax and Liquor Disputes
Between the Citizen Potawatomi Nation and the State of Oklahoma, TURTLE TALK (Oct. 29,
2014),
https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2014/10/29/gaming-compact-dispute-sales-tax-andliquor-disputes-between-the-citizen-potawatomi-nation-and-the-state-of-oklahoma (providing
administrative case materials for In re Revocations of Licenses/Permits of Citizen Potawatomi
Nation, No. JM-14-005-K (Okla. Tax Comm’n 2014)).
14. Dram-shop liability is the “[c]ivil liability of a commercial seller of alcoholic
beverages for personal injury caused by an intoxicated customer.” Dram-Shop Liability,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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I. History of Alcohol Regulation in Indian Country
Solving the current problem of § 1161 requires at least a general
understanding of the complex history of alcohol regulation in Indian
country. Even modernly, the prevalent stereotype of the “drunken Indian”
persists. 15 For example, in a 2016 New York Times interview concerning
the Washington NFL mascot controversy, Houston Texans owner Robert
McNair stated that growing up in western North Carolina, everyone
respected the Cherokee Indians, 16 although “[t]hey might not have
respected the way they held their whiskey.” 17 Worse still, the stereotype
exists within our criminal justice system: in a case involving an Indian
charged with forcible assault, the jury foreman purportedly “told the other
jurors that he used to live on or near an Indian Reservation, that ‘[w]hen
Indians get alcohol, they all get drunk,’ and that when they get drunk, they
get violent.” 18 This stereotype is neither remote nor new: even Benjamin
Franklin once mused that “if it be the Design of Providence to extirpate
these Savages in order to make room for Cultivators of the Earth . . . it
seems not improbable that Rum may be the appointed Means.” 19
The “drunken Indian” stereotype stands as enduring evidence of how
other sovereigns have used alcohol regulation in Indian country as a means
to self-serving ends. From early contact between Europeans and Native
peoples, alcohol and its regulation served as a means of usurping tribal land
and sovereignty. 20 In 1911, prohibitionist and Chief Special Officer of the

15. For an in-depth discussion of the “drunken Indian” stereotype as manifested through
policy and legislation, see generally Robert J. Miller & Maril Hazlett, The “Drunken
Indian”: Myth Distilled into Reality Through Federal Indian Alcohol Policy, 28 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 223 (1996).
16. The Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, a federally recognized tribe, is
headquartered at the Qualla Boundary, within the western portion of North Carolina.
Interestingly, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians has extensively regulated alcohol within
its Indian country. See Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians—Cherokee Code Chapter 18B,
Regulation of Alcoholic Beverages, 77 Fed. Reg. 5265, 5267 (Feb. 2, 2012).
17. Mark Leibovich, Undefeated, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 7, 2016, at MM38, http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/magazine/roger-goodells-unstoppable-football-machine.html.
18. United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir. 2008) (alteration in
original).
19. PETER C. MANCALL, DEADLY MEDICINE: INDIANS AND ALCOHOL IN EARLY
AMERICA 93 (1995) (alteration in original) (quoting BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 199 (Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1964)).
20. See Mimi Ajzenstadt & Brian E. Burtch, Medicalization and Regulation of Alcohol
and Alcoholism: The Professions and Disciplinary Measures, 13 INT’L J.L. & PSYCH. 127,
140 (1990).
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Indian Service, William E. Johnson, stated that all Indian wars had been
either directly or indirectly caused by alcohol.21 As an early example of
European influence, Hudson Bay Company traders used alcohol to establish
contacts with Indians and encouraged them to drink so that the traders could
take advantage of them (and thus boost profits). 22 In response to these types
of actions, Congress enacted the first legislation specifically defining the
contours of Indian affairs: the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790.23 This act
(also referred to as the Nonintercourse Act) introduced federal regulation of
trade with Indians, prohibited the purchase of Indian lands except by
governmental agents, and created punishments for non-Indians who
committed crimes in Indian country. 24
While the original Trade and Intercourse Act was initially written to last
for three years, Congress reenacted the statute every three years and
ultimately passed a permanent Trade and Intercourse Act in 1802. 25 The
1802 Act carried forward the previous policies, and for the first time
authorized the President “to prevent or restrain the vending or distributing
of spirituous liquors among all or any of the said Indian tribes.”26 This
statutory addition “responded to longstanding complaints against the use of
alcohol as a means of defrauding Indian people and a catalyst to violent
conflicts between whites and Indians.” 27 Partly because of its ambiguous
definition of Indian country, the federal government loosely enforced the
1802 Act. 28 In fact, tribes did more during this time to regulate alcohol in
their territories than the federal government. 29 For example, Tecumseh,
prominent leader of the Shawnee, delivered lectures that “ruined the
business of the whiskey peddler throughout the entire central west for a
period of years,” and, “for a long time, intoxication became practically
21. WILLIAM E. JOHNSON, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE LIQUOR TRAFFIC 160
(1911).
22. Id.
23. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 10, § 1.03[2], at 35.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, § 21, 2 Stat. 139, 146.
27. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 10, § 1.03[2], at 38 (citing FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA,
THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 98-99
(Univ. Neb. Press 1984)).
28. Following the enactment of the Act of 1802, “regulations were made by the War
Department to prevent the traffic. This, however, was in the days when the rum ration was
rampant in the army, and the carrying out of a temperance measure was not very thoroughly
done.” JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 197.
29. Id. at 180-87.
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unknown among the western tribes.” 30 Further, many Indian temperance
organizations arose during this period, and several tribes took the
punishment of Indians who consumed alcohol into their own hands.31
The Act of 1834, passed during Andrew Jackson’s presidency, sought to
more strictly regulate the alcohol trade in Indian country. Adding to the
language of the 1802 Act, the 1834 Act constituted the first outright
prohibition of alcohol in Indian country. This Act prohibited the
introduction or attempted introduction of alcohol into Indian country,
prohibited distilleries in Indian country, and established specific
punishments for violations. 32 On the same day the Act of 1834 was passed,
Congress placed all of Indian affairs under the jurisdiction of the War
Department. 33 The Act of 1834 included an exemption for all liquor traffic
that the War Department deemed necessary. 34 But because the War
Department’s military forts and Indian agents served as the primary contact
between reservation Indians and non-Indians, this exemption led to the nonenforcement of the prohibition.35 Refusing to rely solely on federal
regulation, several tribes passed their own legislation prohibiting the
introduction of alcohol into their lands. 36
To strengthen the Act of 1834, Congress again amended its Indian
alcohol policy in 1862 37 and 1864. 38 These measures prohibited any person
(including an Indian) from selling or providing liquor to Indians, regardless
of whether or not the transaction occurred in Indian country. 39 In 1865,
however, the Supreme Court distinguished the federal government’s power
to prohibit alcohol for Indians who were government wards and the police
power of states to regulate Indians who no longer had tribal ties.40 The

30. Id. at 183.
31. Id. at 183-87.
32. Act of June 30, 1834 (Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834), ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, as
amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1847, ch. 66, 9 Stat. 203; Act of July 29, 1848, ch. 118, § 3, 9
Stat. 252, 264; Act of Mar. 27, 1854, ch. 26, §§ 3-6, 10 Stat. 269, 270; Act of Feb. 13, 1862,
ch. 24, 12 Stat. 338; Act of Mar. 15, 1864, ch. 33, 13 Stat. 29 (carried forward in REV. STAT.
tit. 28, ch. 4, §§ 2139-2141 (2d ed. 1878)).
33. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 162, 4 Stat. 735.
34. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, ch. 161, § 10.
35. JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 196-97.
36. Id. at 188-92 (summarizing the tribal governments passing prohibition legislation).
37. Act of Feb. 13, 1862, ch. 24, 12 Stat. 338.
38. Act of Mar. 15, 1864, ch. 33, 13 Stat. 29 (carried forward in REV. STAT. tit. 28, ch.
4, § 2140 (2d. ed. 1878)) (recodified in part at 18 U.S.C. § 3113 (1994)).
39. Act of Feb. 13 1862, ch. 24, 12 Stat. 338; JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 198-99.
40. United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 416 (1865).
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jurisdictional confusion stemming from this distinction again led to loose
enforcement of the prohibition.41
During the Allotment Era (1871-1928), Congress aimed to “civiliz[e]
and assimilat[e]” Indians. 42 To further this policy, Congress passed
legislation allowing for the allotment of tribal lands, attempting to push
Indians toward a more agricultural lifestyle while (conveniently) creating
surplus lands which could then be opened to white settlers. 43 Allotment led
to the breakup of vast tribal land bases in Indian Territory (modern-day
Oklahoma). 44 In 1895, Congress passed a special act to specifically prohibit
alcohol in Indian Territory. 45
In 1906, Congress passed the Oklahoma Enabling Act, which allowed
for the admission of Indian Territory and Oklahoma Territory as the State
of Oklahoma. 46 The statute specifically stated, “[N]othing in the
[Oklahoma] constitution shall be construed to limit or impair the rights of
person or property pertaining to the Indians . . . or to limit or affect the
authority of the [federal government] to make any law or regulation
respecting such Indians.” 47 Following allotment and statehood, courts
determined that lands “held in trust or restricted status for an Indian tribe
are Indian country, regardless whether those lands constitute a ‘formal’
reservation.” 48 And in 1911, the Eighth Circuit specifically held that tribal
lands of the Five Tribes (Chickasaw, Cherokee, Choctaw, Creek, and
Seminole) remained Indian country for purposes of federal liquor laws.49
In 1919, Congress passed the National Prohibition Act, prohibiting
alcohol for the entire nation. 50 The Twenty-First Amendment repealed
national prohibition in 1933. 51 National prohibition and its subsequent
repeal, however, did not affect Indian liquor laws.52 Prohibition in Indian

41. Miller & Hazlett, supra note 15, at 248.
42. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 10, § 1.04, at 72.
43. Id.
44. See JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 191.
45. Act of Mar. 1, 1895, ch. 145, § 8, 28 Stat. 693, 697; see also JOHNSON, supra note
21, at 203.
46. Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267.
47. Id.
48. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 10, § 4.07[1][b], at 292.
49. U.S. Express Co. v. Friedman, 191 F. 673, 679 (8th Cir. 1911).
50. Act of Oct. 28, 1919 (Volstead Act), ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305.
51. See DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 1-21 (1979).
52. See Kennedy v. United States, 265 U.S. 344, 346 (1924) (holding that the National
Prohibition Act did not repeal Indian liquor laws).
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country remained in place until Congress adopted 18 U.S.C. § 1161 during
the Termination Era.
II. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 Analysis
Enacted in 1953, 18 U.S.C. § 1161 allows tribes to authorize liquor in
the areas of Indian country under their jurisdiction. Section 1161—titled
“Application of Indian liquor laws”—states:
The provisions of sections 1154, 1156, 3113, 3488, and 3669, of
this title, shall not apply within any area that is not Indian
country, nor to any act or transaction within any area of Indian
country provided such act or transaction is in conformity both
with the laws of the State in which such act or transaction occurs
and with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having
jurisdiction over such area of Indian country, certified by the
Secretary of the Interior, and published in the Federal Register. 53
The five sections listed in § 1161 prohibit liquor in Indian country. Section
1154 prohibits the distribution of intoxicants in Indian country, stating,
“Whoever sells, gives away, disposes of, exchanges, or barters any
[liquor] . . . into the Indian country” shall be fined and imprisoned (or both)
for up to one year for the first offense, and fined and imprisoned (or both)
for up to five years for subsequent offenses. 54 Section 1156 prohibits the
possession of intoxicants and allows the same penalties listed in § 1154. 55
Section 3113 authorizes “any superintendent of Indian affairs, or
commanding officer of a military post, or special agent of the Office of
Indian Affairs” having probable cause to conduct searches of persons
suspected of violating § 1154 or § 1156. 56 Section 3488 states that
possession of intoxicants in Indian country constitutes “prima facie
evidence of unlawful introduction.” 57 Finally, § 3669 allows for the seizure,
libel, and forfeiture of any conveyance used to introduce intoxicants into
Indian country. 58
Most importantly here, § 1161 allows tribes to opt out of these
prohibitions if liquor transactions in Indian country conform to (1) state law
and (2) a tribal ordinance adopted by the tribe with jurisdiction in that area
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

18 U.S.C. § 1161 (2012).
Id. § 1154.
Id. § 1156.
Id. § 3113.
Id. § 3488.
Id. § 3669.
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of Indian country. 59 If a tribe chooses not to adopt such an ordinance, liquor
remains prohibited in that area of Indian country. 60
The Indian Termination policy of the era sheds light on why Congress
enacted § 1161. The section was enacted under Public Law 277, titled “An
Act to eliminate certain discriminatory legislation against Indians in the
United States.” 61 The original bill applied only to Arizona, but the
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs made the measure generally
applicable. 62 Senate Report 722 states, “[I]f this bill is enacted, a State or
local municipality or Indian tribes, if they desire, by the enactment of
proper legislation or ordinance, to restrict the sales of intoxicants to Indians,
they may do so.” 63 Further, the Senate Report included the input of Indians
as a reason for the statute: “The Indians for many years have complained
that the liquor laws are most discriminatory in nature. The Indians feel that,
irrespective of the merits or demerits of prohibition, it is unfair to legislate
specifically against them in this matter.”64
While its stated intent was to erase federal prejudice against Indians or
tribes in the context of alcohol, § 1161 created a different prejudice by
effectively precluding tribes from formulating their own substantive liquor
laws. And this aligned with the termination efforts of the day as Congress
aimed
as rapidly as possible to make the Indians . . . subject to the same
laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as
are applicable to other citizens . . . to end their status as
wards . . . and to grant them all of the rights and prerogatives
pertaining to American citizens. 65
As part of its attempt to erase federal exceptions for Indians, Congress
enacted § 1161 to move away from extensive federal regulation of alcohol
in Indian country. Reading beyond the references to “prejudice” in the
legislative history, Congress more likely acted to further its termination
goal of eradicating tribal and Indian statuses altogether. Senate Report 722
supports this view: “[The] committee is of the belief that all legislation
discriminating against our Indian citizens should be abolished. Termination
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. § 1161.
Id.
Pub. L. No. 277, 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 660 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (2012)).
S. REP. NO. 83-722 (1953), as reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2399, 2400.
Id.
Id.
H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
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of the subjection of Indians to Federal laws applicable only to Indians
certainly appears to be desirable.” 66
III. Supreme Court Review and Interpretation of Section 1161
The Supreme Court first reviewed § 1161 in United States v. Mazurie. 67
Mazurie involved non-Indian bar owners convicted of introducing alcohol
into Indian country for failure to obtain a tribal liquor license. 68 The bar
owners had attempted to obtain a tribal liquor license, but their application
was denied after tribal citizens protested.69 Despite the license denial, the
bar owners continued to sell liquor, which led to federal criminal
prosecution and seizure of the alcoholic beverages.70 Mazurie turned on the
tribe’s ability to regulate liquor on non-Indian fee land within the
reservation. 71 That analysis proves unhelpful in Oklahoma, where no formal
reservations remain and the majority of Indian country is “trust land,” as
defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c). 72 But the Court’s reasoning on the tribal
ability to enact and enforce liquor laws proves very instructive. The Court
determined that Congress could delegate to tribes the power to regulate
liquor within their territories. 73 Because Congress properly delegated this
power, the Court did not address whether tribes possess independent and
inherent power to regulate liquor.74 Further, the Court rejected the
argument that the tribe could not exercise regulatory jurisdiction over the
bar owners because they were non-Indians. 75 Citing its opinion in Williams
v. Lee, 76 the Court reiterated that tribes have authority over their land
subject only to congressional defeasance.77
Mazurie validated tribal authority to regulate under § 1161. The Court
similarly validated a state’s authority to regulate liquor in Indian country
under § 1161 in Rice v. Rehner. 78 In Rice, a federally licensed Indian trader
66. S. REP. NO. 83-722.
67. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
68. Id. at 548.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 549.
72. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012).
73. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557.
74. Id. (“We need not decide whether this independent authority is itself sufficient for
the tribes to impose Ordinance No. 26.”).
75. Id. at 557-58.
76. 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
77. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557-58.
78. 463 U.S. 713, 734-35 (1983).
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who owned a store on the Pala Reservation challenged California’s
regulation requiring that he obtain a state liquor license. 79 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that California could not require a license because §
1161 had a preemptive effect, which conferred the authority to tribes
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.80 Interestingly, a
legal commentator reviewing the Ninth Circuit’s holding (before Supreme
Court review) stated, “Although possibly intended as a method of achieving
the assimilation of Indians into the U.S. mainstream, § 1161 at least
recognizes the ability of the Indian tribes to govern and control their own
lives as far as intoxicants are concerned.” 81 Further, the article noted that
“[e]conomic interests seem[ed] to be at the heart of [California’s] claims for
regulatory jurisdiction, rather than concerns for uniform, statewide
enforcement.” 82
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, noting that tribal
sovereignty served only as a backdrop to inform preemption analysis. The
Court suggested that “tradition simply has not recognized a sovereign
immunity or inherent authority in favor of liquor regulation by Indians.” 83
Whereas the Mazurie Court cited Williams v. Lee in support of tribal liquor
regulation, the Rice Court concluded that the Williams presumption of
sovereignty “would be unwarranted in the narrow context of the regulation
of liquor.” 84
In establishing this exception, the Court cited the long history of federal
and state regulation of liquor in Indian country. 85 Specifically, the Court
highlighted that Congress required several states—including Oklahoma—to
prohibit the sale of liquor to Indians as a condition of entry into the United
States. 86 Further, the Court finally addressed the question of inherent tribal
authority that it avoided in Mazurie, stating, “There can be no doubt that
Congress has divested the Indians of any inherent power to regulate in this
area.” 87 Thus, the Court held that California possessed authority to require
licensing under § 1161. 88 The Court concluded that “Congress did not
79. Id. at 715-16.
80. Id. at 717.
81. Thomas E. Lilley, Regulatory Jurisdiction over Indian Country Retail Liquor Sales,
23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 239, 245 (1983).
82. Id.
83. Rice, 463 U.S. at 722.
84. Id. at 723.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 724.
88. Id. at 735.
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intend to make tribal members ‘super citizens’ who could trade in a
traditionally regulated substance free from all but self-imposed
regulations.” 89
The Supreme Court has not directly reviewed § 1161 since Rice, and the
last time the Court even mentioned the statute was in the 1989 case of
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation. 90 The
Court recently had an opportunity to address the statute, at least
tangentially, in the 2016 case of Nebraska v. Parker. 91 But the Court
remained silent on § 1161. Parker originated in Omaha Tribal Court, where
non-Indian business owners sought injunctive and declaratory relief from
the Omaha Tribal Council members who attempted to enforce the tribal
liquor license and tax scheme on them. 92 Instead of directly challenging the
tribe’s jurisdiction to regulate alcohol under § 1161, the owners claimed
that their businesses operated outside of Indian country because Congress
intended to diminish the reservation boundaries when it passed an 1882 Act
calling for allotment of the Omaha Reservation.93 In other words, if the
1882 Act diminished the reservation, then the tribe possesses no regulatory
jurisdiction over the business owners who own the land in fee. Despite this
argument, the tribe prevailed in every court: the Omaha Tribal Court, the
United States Court for the District of Nebraska, 94 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,95 and the Supreme Court 96 all held that
the 1882 Act did not diminish the reservation, and so the tribe may enforce
its alcohol regulations on the business owners.
Though Parker turned on land distinctions, it sheds light on the tension
that § 1161 creates between states and tribes. The State of Nebraska
intervened in Parker at the district court level after the Omaha Tribal
Council demanded that the Nebraska Tax Commissioner remit the tribal
share of the fuel tax revenue from retailers located within the reservation
boundaries. 97 The Supreme Court briefs in Parker highlight a pointed
89. Id. at 734 (citing Rehner v. Rice, 678 F.2d 1340, 1352 (9th Cir. 1982) (Goodwin, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 463 U.S. 713 (1983)).
90. 492 U.S. 408, 428 (1989).
91. 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1078 (2016).
92. Smith v. Parker, 996 F. Supp. 2d 815, 817 (D. Neb.), aff’d, 774 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir.
2014), aff’d sub nom., Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 844.
95. Smith v. Parker, 774 F.3d 1166, 1169 (8th Cir. 2014), aff’d sub nom., Nebraska v.
Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).
96. Parker, 136 S. Ct. at 1072.
97. Parker, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 831.
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argument about tribal motivations for regulating liquor. For example, the
petitioners’ brief (Nebraska, et al.) concluded with the following statement:
Respondents’ recent effort to assert jurisdiction in the disputed
area is not a comprehensive plan to administer a broad array of
government services in and around Pender, but rather simply to
derive revenue from the sale of alcohol in Pender’s liquor
retailers and bars. In service of that goal, Respondents ask this
Court to rewrite history. 98
In other words, according to the State of Nebraska, the tribe’s attempt to
regulate alcohol amounted to nothing more than a money grab.
Interestingly, this argument flips the observation made by the article
discussing the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Rice (this time, a state has accused
a tribe of money-grabbing). 99
The Omaha Tribal Council respondents argued that business owners
attempted to hide behind a hypothetical jurisdictional confusion that could
ensue if the reservation remains intact.100 Refuting this argument, the Tribal
Council members claimed that “[i]n light of [the] well-established doctrinal
tools to protect the rights of non-Indians, Petitioners’ and amici’s poorlydefined and inaccurate ‘parade of horribles’ rings hollow.” 101 They further
argued that any jurisdictional problems could be jointly solved: “[S]tate,
local, tribal, and federal officials can work cooperatively to allocate and,
where appropriate, share jurisdiction.” 102
The National Congress of American Indians 103 (“NCAI”) submitted an
amicus brief in support of the tribal respondents, stating, “If tribal authority
to regulate liquor sales in non-Indian communities in Indian country is
problematic, the solution lies either with Congress or with a proper
challenge to the scope of § 1161, not with the revision of this Court’s wellestablished reservation-boundary jurisprudence.” 104 NCAI implied that the
98. Brief for Petitioners at 52, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016) (No. 141406).
99. Lilley, supra note 81, at 245.
100. Brief for Omaha Tribal Council Respondents at 21, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct.
1072 (2016) (No. 14-1406).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 59.
103. Founded in 1944, the National Congress of American Indians is the oldest and
largest organization aimed at promoting the interests of tribal governments and communities.
See NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/ (last visited May 12, 2017).
104. Brief for National Congress of American Indians et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 7, Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016) (No. 14-1406).
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scope of § 1161 was the crux of the issue: “The Court’s inability to consider
the scope of Section 1161 is another reason why the Court might wish to
consider whether the writ was improvidently granted.”105
Despite these arguments, the Court limited its unanimous decision to the
diminishment issue, holding that the 1882 Act did not diminish the Omaha
reservation. 106 Justice Thomas authored the opinion and made no mention
of § 1161. Although the statute played no role in the outcome of the case,
the arguments raised by the parties illustrate that the scope of § 1161
remains in question and that the underlying policy reasoning of the statute
warrants reevaluation.
IV. State Taxation of Non-Indian Liquor Transactions in Indian Country
While § 1161 presents a number of potential problems, two specific
issues highlight the friction stemming from the statute: taxation and dramshop liability. Issues of state taxation of non-Indians engaged in business in
Indian country extend far beyond the context of alcohol. For example,
Oklahoma and several tribes within the state have extensively litigated the
state’s taxation of cigarettes and motor fuels purchased by non-Indians in
Indian country. 107 Unlike those contexts, states have argued in the alcohol
context that § 1161 provides direct congressional authorization of stateimposed taxation. Further, Oklahoma’s alcohol regulatory scheme
aggravates this issue by conditioning the grant and retention of a liquor
license on the payment of state taxes. 108 In an attempt to regulate tribes,
Oklahoma has threatened to revoke tribes’ liquor licenses and has claimed
the right to tax alcohol transactions by non-Indians in Indian country. 109
The legal validity of these types of actions taken against tribes often turn
on murky, case-by-case questions of Federal Indian law. The Supreme
Court has held that states may tax the activities of non-Indian citizens in
Indian country subject to a “flexible pre-emption analysis sensitive to the

105. Id. at 7 n.4.
106. Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1075 (2016).
107. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995) (motor fuels
tax); see also Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498
U.S. 505 (1991) (cigarette tax).
108. See 68 OKLA. STAT. § 212 (2011 & Supp. 2012); 37A OKLA. STAT. § 1-112
(effective Oct. 1, 2018), http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?Cite
ID=479532.
109. In re Revocations of Licenses/Permits of Citizen Potawatomi Nation, No. JM-14005-K (Okla. Tax Comm’n 2014).
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particular facts and legislation involved.” 110 But the Court has not directly
addressed whether § 1161 permits states to bypass the standard preemption
analysis and automatically impose state taxes on non-Indian alcohol
transactions in Indian country. The judicial trend in the taxation cases does
not ensure a tribal victory through litigation. Therefore, the best answer—
even beyond the alcohol context—remains to involve tribes in the existing
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax system, which apportions tax collection
between sovereigns. Alternatively, states and tribes may enter into specific
cooperative agreements similar to those that have been employed in the
tobacco context.
As applied to tribes, Oklahoma’s alcohol scheme presents a specific
problem because of the state’s ability to revoke licenses upon failure to
timely remit state sales taxes.111 Title 37, section 528 of the Oklahoma
Statutes states, “Any [liquor] license issued . . . may be revoked or
suspended if . . . the licensee has . . . [h]ad any permit or license issued by
the Oklahoma Tax Commission and required by the Oklahoma Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act, suspended or revoked by the Tax Commission.” 112
The revocability of a license for tax purposes applies to both low-point
beer 113 and alcoholic beverages, 114 which is defined as “alcohol, spirits,
[non low-point] beer, and wine.” 115
While Rice suggests that tribes in Oklahoma must obtain Oklahoma
liquor licenses in order to comply with state law, the Supreme Court has not
addressed how taxation might factor into a state liquor regulatory scheme
when applied to tribes. And lower courts have yet to decide a case
involving a sales tax imposed via § 1161 strictly analogous to the
Oklahoma liquor tax scheme. But courts have addressed other states’
alcohol schemes imposed under § 1161. In Squaxin Island Tribe v.
Washington, the Ninth Circuit broadly construed § 1161, holding that
Washington could tax tribal liquor sales to nontribal members. 116
Washington operated a monopoly liquor system in which the state Liquor
Control Board purchased liquor from distributors and then retailed it
through state stores at board-fixed prices. 117 Tribes in Washington,
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989).
37 OKLA. STAT. § 577(F) (2011).
Id. § 528(A)(7).
Id. § 163.16(4).
Id. § 528(A)(7).
Id. § 506(3).
781 F.2d 715, 724 (9th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 717.
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however, purchased liquor from out-of-state distributors and sold it in tribal
liquor stores with prices including tribal taxes but excluding state taxes and
surcharges. 118 Following Rice, Washington demanded that tribes obtain
vendor agreements with the state which required prepayment of liquor costs
and state liquor sales taxes. 119 Four tribes then brought suit against the state,
claiming that Washington lacked authority to tax tribal liquor enterprises.120
The tribes argued that the state tax on tribal liquor sales aimed purely to
maximize revenue and thus fell outside of the narrow holding of Rice,
which applied solely to liquor licensing. 121 The Ninth Circuit disagreed,
noting that Rice held that tribal sovereignty interests were only implicated
in sales of liquor to tribal members, and therefore the tribes’ claims “[did]
not merit serious consideration.” 122 Further, the court found that “the
‘primary purpose of the liquor control system in Washington is control,’ not
revenue.” 123 Under this expansive reading of Rice and § 1161, the Ninth
Circuit essentially conflated the power to require liquor licensing with the
power to tax tribal liquor sales in Indian country.
The tribes in Squaxin additionally argued that the state taxation directly
burdened 124 tribal members and the operation of tribal government and thus
was impermissible. 125 Again, the court flatly rejected this argument, noting
that the backdrop analysis in Rice identified no tradition of sovereign
immunity or inherent authority of liquor regulation by Indians. 126 Under
this characterization of Rice, a state could presumably attach any condition
to liquor licensing. This directly conflicts with the Supreme Court’s
statements in Rice that liquor licensing is a narrow exception to the general
rule of tribal sovereignty. Squaxin has received no direct negative treatment
and remains good law within the Ninth Circuit.
Note that the liquor control scheme applied in Washington differs
significantly from the scheme in Oklahoma, which more resembles the
California free enterprise system reviewed in Rice. In Rice, California
sought to regulate the state liquor industry through licensing whereas in
118. Id.
119. WASH. REV. CODE § 82.08.150 (amended 1989).
120. Squaxin, 781 F.2d at 717-18, 718 n.4.
121. Id. at 720.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425
U.S. 463 (1976); see also Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S.
685 (1965).
125. Squaxin, 781 F.2d at 719.
126. Id.
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Squaxin, Washington sought to completely operate the state liquor industry
through a monopoly system. Thus, the court in Squaxin may have deferred
more broadly to Washington because a tribal competitor likely posed a
significant threat of competition to a heavily state-controlled system. 127
The State of Oklahoma has prevailed in imposing at least one of its
alcohol taxes in Indian country. In Chickasaw Nation v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Oklahoma Tax Commission, the Tenth Circuit upheld the imposition of an
Oklahoma tax on 3.2% beer wholesale distributors who sold to tribal retail
stores. 128 In addition to the low-point beer tax, Chickasaw Nation also
involved challenges to the state motor fuel taxes and state income taxes. 129
The tribe argued that the holding in Rice did not equate the state’s power to
regulate liquor transactions with the power to tax those transactions. 130 The
Tenth Circuit agreed only to an extent, stating, “We agree that the power to
regulate does not automatically encompass the power to tax.” 131 The Tenth
Circuit further clarified that taxation could be regulatory so long as it
played “an integral part of the overall regulatory structure.”132 In
determining whether the tax played an integral part, the court focused on
two facts. First, the court found the tax primarily regulatory in nature
because it was located in title 37 (which regulates intoxicating liquors) of
the Oklahoma Statutes and thus differed from other taxes (including sales
taxes) in title 68. 133 Second, the court found that the legal incidence of the
tax fell on the distributors because the tax was imposed on distributors and
not directly on the tribe.134 Accordingly, the court upheld the tax as an
integral part of the overall alcohol regulatory scheme. 135 The Tenth
Circuit’s reasoning illustrates the formalistic approach modernly taken in

127. This aligns with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the tribal tobacco cases, in which
the Supreme Court held that tribes were essentially marketing a “tax exemption.” See, e.g.,
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 155
(1980) (“It is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the smokeshops to persons
coming from outside is not generated on the reservations by activities in which the Tribes
have a significant interest.”).
128. 31 F.3d 964, 967-68 (10th Cir. 1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub
nom. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, vacated in part sub nom.
Chickasaw Nation v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 64 F.3d 577 (10th Cir. 1995).
129. Id. at 966.
130. Id. at 968.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 969.
135. Id. at 968.
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Indian taxation cases. But, as a practical matter, whether the legal incidence
falls on the distributor, the tribe, or the consumer carries little relevance
because the tax will inevitably raise the overall price and negatively affect
tribal interests.
Following the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Chickasaw Nation, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, but only on the issues of the motor fuels
tax and income tax.136 While the tax on low-point beer was not granted
certiorari, the Supreme Court’s review of the motor fuels tax and income
tax in Chickasaw Nation illustrates Oklahoma’s persistence on taxing tribal
businesses and forecasts the actions the state may take if litigation over
alcohol taxation occurs in the future.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that Oklahoma could not apply its
motor fuels tax to fuel sold by the tribe in Indian country but that the state
could tax income of all persons residing in the state outside of Indian
country. 137 Oklahoma argued that the Court should weigh the relevant state
and tribal interests in reviewing the motor fuels tax.138 The Court, however,
employed a more categorical approach: “‘[A]bsent cession of jurisdiction or
other federal statutes permitting it,’ we have held, a State is without power
to tax reservation lands and reservation Indians.” 139 Under this categorical
approach, the case turned on the legal incidence of the tax: “If the legal
incidence of an excise tax rests on a tribe or on tribal members for sales
made inside Indian country, the tax cannot be enforced absent clear
congressional authorization.” 140
Unsurprisingly, the motor fuels tax at issue 141 failed to specify which
party the legal incidence rested on. 142 In the absence of express language,
the Court determined the legal incidence fell on tribal retailers because the
taxing statute required fuel distributors to remit the amount of tax due “on
behalf of a licensed retailer.” 143 Furthermore, the tax did not impose
liability on a consumer for purchasing or possessing untaxed fuel.144

136. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 452-53 (1995).
137. Id. at 467.
138. Id. at 457.
139. Id. at 458 (quoting County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima
Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 258 (1992)).
140. Id. at 459 (citing Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976)).
141. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 505(c) (1991) (repealed 1996).
142. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 461.
143. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 68 OKLA. STAT. § 505(c) (1991) (repealed 1996)).
144. Id. at 462.
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Ultimately, the Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s finding that the legal
incidence fell on the tribe, thus rendering the tax impermissible.145
In reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chickasaw Nation,
Oklahoma restructured the motor fuel tax and recodified it at title 68,
sections 500.1–531 of the Oklahoma Statutes. 146 The Oklahoma legislature
rewrote the code and expressly placed the legal incidence on consumers: “It
is the intent of the Legislature that the taxes imposed on motor fuel have
always been and continue to be declared and conclusively presumed to be a
direct tax on the ultimate or retail consumer.”147 Further, the legislature
identified the specific reason for the statutory rewrite: “The purpose of this
recodification is a result of the interpretation of the motor fuel tax code of
this state by the federal courts, specifically the decision by the Supreme
Court of the United States in ‘Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw
Nation.’” 148
As illustrated in Chickasaw Nation, courts question whether a tax serves
regulatory or pecuniary purposes in determining its applicability in Indian
country. The Tenth Circuit deemed the low-point beer tax primarily
regulatory simply based on its location in title 37 of the Oklahoma
Statutes. 149 Other Oklahoma liquor permits, however, differ from the tax on
low-point beer upheld in Chickasaw Nation. For example, while the mixed
beverage tax permit is also located in title 37, the requirement of a sales tax
permit in that section refers explicitly to title 68 of the Oklahoma
Statutes. 150 This is distinguishable from the tax on low-point beer which
does not refer to any other section of the state code.151 If a court followed
the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in Chickasaw Nation as to the mixed
beverage permit, the fact that the condition of a sales tax permit refers back
to title 68 could indicate a more pecuniary purpose. In any event, under the
Supreme Court’s formalistic approach, the legal incidence of the tax likely
controls the outcome. And the Oklahoma Sales Tax expressly states that
“this Code shall be construed as imposing a tax upon the sale of tangible
145. Id.
146. See Ryals v. Keating, 2000 OK CIV APP 24, 2 P.3d 378 (discussing changes to the
Motor Fuel Tax Code after Chickasaw Nation).
147. 68 OKLA. STAT. § 500.2 (2011)).
148. Id. (internal citation omitted).
149. Chickasaw Nation v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 31 F.3d 964, 968 (10th
Cir. 1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. Okla. Tax Comm’n v.
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, vacated in part sub nom. Chickasaw Nation v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 64 F.3d 577 (10th Cir. 1995).
150. 37 OKLA. STAT. § 577(E) (2011).
151. Id. § 163.6.
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personal property and services, not otherwise exempted, to the
consumer.” 152
Litigation is currently underway on this exact issue in the federal court
system. For example, in the United States District Court for the District of
South Dakota, Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Gerlach involves a dispute
between South Dakota and the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe over the
applicability of the state’s use tax to non-Indian liquor transactions within
the tribe’s Indian country. 153 The tribe holds three state liquor licenses
granted pursuant to South Dakota law. 154 Similar to the Oklahoma scheme,
these licenses are conditioned upon the remittance of state taxes.155
When the tribe sought to renew its licenses in 2009 and 2010, South
Dakota denied the applications, stating that taxes incurred by non-Indians
had not been remitted.156 The state based its decision on section 35-2-24 of
the South Dakota Codified Laws, which states in pertinent part:
No license granted under this title may be reissued to an Indian
tribe operating in Indian country controlled by the Indian tribe or
to an enrolled tribal member operating in Indian country
controlled by the enrolled tribal member's tribe until the Indian
tribe or enrolled tribal member remits to the Department of
Revenue all use tax incurred by nonmembers as a result of the
operation of the licensed premises, and any other state tax has
been remitted or is not delinquent. 157
Following an adverse decision in a state administrative proceeding, the tribe
filed suit in federal court, seeking a preliminary injunction.158 In one of its
specific claims, the tribe alleges that section 35-2-24 violates 18 U.S.C. §
1161. 159 The State then moved for a judgment on the pleadings under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). 160
The court denied the State’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and
thus the case remains at the district court level.161 The ultimate resolution of
this case should garner the attention of tribes within Oklahoma, given the
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

68 OKLA. STAT. § 1351 (2011) (emphasis added).
Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Gerlach, 155 F. Supp. 3d 972, 977 (D.S.D. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 35-2-24 (2011).
Flandreau Santee Sioux, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 977.
Id. at 978.
Id.
Id.
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similarities in the two states’ alcohol regulatory schemes. In the interim,
District Judge Lawrence Piersol’s opinion denying the motion for judgment
on the pleadings proves instructive. The arguments articulated in Flandreau
resemble those at the heart of this article and likely to appear if litigation
occurs between tribes and Oklahoma on this issue. South Dakota argues
that the tribe consented to the state’s licensing scheme, and thus state
taxation, when it applied for a state liquor license.162 The tribe counters
with two arguments. First, the state cannot “convert invalid on-reservation
taxes into valid taxes by merely conditioning alcohol licensure on paying
the taxes.” 163 Second, the state’s power to regulate under § 1161 “does not
empower the state to attach tax conditions to licensures that have no nexus
to alcohol regulation.” 164 Ultimately, this case turns on the scope of § 1161.
In considering the State’s motion, the court began by reciting the plain
language of § 1161 and then summarized the Rice decision. 165 On the
specific issue of whether a state may condition liquor licenses upon the
remittance of taxes, the court stated that the Rice decision “departs from
relevance” because of its silence on “the more discrete issue of what
conditions may be attached to licensure.”166 Further, the court characterized
South Dakota’s argument to mean “that the state laws the tribes must
comply with may be of indeterminate scope and contemplate a vast array of
subject matter unrelated to alcohol regulation.”167 The court also dismissed
the State’s reliance on Squaxin, stating that the “state tax [in Squaxin] was
valid as it was confined strictly to alcohol sales marketed toward nonmembers who were being empowered to avoid state tax impositions.” 168
Unlike Squaxin, the South Dakota scheme shares no apparent nexus with
alcohol. 169
Ultimately, the court deemed the tribe’s pleadings adequate and denied
the State’s motion. 170 Further, the court identified that the core issue of the
case turns on the reconciliation of a state’s regulatory authority under §
1161 with the fact that a “state's authority to tax in Indian country is
operationally curtailed by a tribe's sovereign immunity.” 171 Though the case
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 997.
Id. at 998.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 999.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1000.
Id. at 999-1000.
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remains at an early stage, the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe won a battle by
surviving South Dakota’s motion. The district court could have easily
shoehorned this case under a broad reading of Rice or attempted to resolve
the case on other grounds. But, for the time being, it seems a federal district
court stands poised to address the effect of § 1161 on state taxation in
Indian country.
This issue could also lead to litigation in Oklahoma. For example, the
Citizen Potawatomi Nation (“Nation”) recently prevailed in arbitration over
the State of Oklahoma on the issue of the state’s ability to impose taxes on
non-Indian liquor sales in Indian country. 172 The dispute began in 2014
when the Oklahoma Tax Commission (“OTC”) filed an administrative
complaint against the Nation and sought to revoke the Nation’s state liquor
licenses for failure to remit state taxes.173 In this initial complaint, the OTC
claimed that Oklahoma sales taxes apply to all sales by the Nation to
nontribal members. 174 The Nation argued that its gaming compact with
Oklahoma required OTC to pursue its claim through arbitration.175 After
arbitration began, the OTC threatened to close all of the Nation’s businesses
for failure to comply with Oklahoma tax laws.176
The arbitrator (former Oklahoma Supreme Court Justice Daniel J.
Boudreau) 177 “characterized the underlying dispute in [the] proceeding as
centering primarily on the Nation’s contention that they have no obligation
to accede to the State’s demand for all of the Nation’s businesses to collect,
report and remit sales taxes on sales of goods and services to nontribal
members.” 178 Much of the arbitration award focuses on the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act and the gaming compact between the Nation and the state.
But ultimately, the Nation won on the argument that even if Oklahoma’s
Tax Code applies to the Nation’s sales to non-Indians, it would be
preempted by the federal balancing test established by the Supreme Court
in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker. 179 The arbitrator agreed, and
he did so based on four findings. First, the Nation identified “significant
federal and tribal interests in the Nation’s self-governance, economic self172. Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Oklahoma, No. 01-15-0003-3452 (Am. Arb. Ass’n
Apr. 4, 2016) (Boudreau, Arb.) [hereinafter Arbitration Award].
173. Id. at 2.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Daniel J. Bordreau, DISP. RESOL. CONSULTANTS, http://www.drc-ok.com/
boudreau-cv/ (last visited May 12, 2017).
178. Arbitration Award, supra note 172, at 3.
179. Id. at 4-5; see also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
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sufficiency, and self-determination.” 180 Second, “the Nation alone invests
value in the goods and services that it sells, does not derive such value
through an exemption from State sales taxes, and imposes its own
equivalent tribal sales tax on the sales.” 181 Third, “the State possesses no
economic interest beyond a general quest for additional revenue in
imposing [its] sales tax.” 182 And fourth, “the federal and tribal interests at
stake predominate significantly over any possible State interest in the
transactions.” 183
Interestingly, the arbitrator applied the Bracker balancing analysis, 184
which was developed in 1980 and significantly predates the more
categorical and formal approach taken by the Supreme Court in Chickasaw
Nation.
While this arbitration award bodes well for tribes in Oklahoma, the State
of Oklahoma has shown a willingness to amend its statutes to
circumnavigate adverse decisions, as illustrated by the legislative actions
taken following Chickasaw Nation. While amending § 1161 could erase the
question of the statute’s current scope, taxation questions may persist. On a
practical level, better avenues than litigation exist, including seeking
inclusion in Oklahoma’s existing Streamlined Sales and Use Tax statute or
through direct cooperative agreements with the state.
V. The Taxation Solution: Inclusion in the Sales and Use Tax Scheme
and Cooperative Agreements
As discussed above, the issue of taxation causes friction between the
state and tribes as each sovereign attempts to maximize its tax base. The
Supreme Court has held that a tribe’s authority to tax is an inherent
government function.185 But for products without “reservation generated
value,” the state may tax non-Indian purchases of that product in Indian
country. 186 For example, courts likely will not find reservation-generated
value in tribal cigarette sales when the cigarettes are imported from outside
of Indian country. 187 This creates a potential double taxation problem where
180. Arbitration Award, supra note 172, at 5.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144-45.
185. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137-40 (1982).
186. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 155 (1980) (no preemption for tribes that were merely “market[ing] a [tax] exemption).
187. Id.
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both the tribe and the state may tax a non-Indian purchase. And the extra
tax necessarily raises the overall price, which negatively affects a tribe’s
ability to compete.
The State of Oklahoma and tribes have addressed tax issues in compacts
concerning certain industries, including gaming, 188 tobacco, 189 and
hunting, 190 among others. In the tobacco context, compacts focus directly
on taxation. For example, the compact between Oklahoma and the Absentee
Shawnee Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma states that “the Tribe acknowledges
that the State tobacco tax does apply to sales to non-members of the Tribe,
even if they occur on tribal lands.” 191 The compact then outlines a detailed
description of how tobacco taxes are to be imposed and apportioned
between the tribe and state. 192
The Model Tribal Gaming Compact, however, does not address taxes
with the same specificity as the tobacco compact. The compact does
contemplate the sale of alcohol in gaming facilities: “The sale and service
of alcoholic beverages in a facility shall be in compliance with state, federal
and tribal law in regard to the licensing and sale of such beverages.” 193 But
on the issue of taxation, the compact only states, “Nothing in this Compact
shall be deemed to authorize the state to impose any tax, fee, charge or
assessment upon the tribe or enterprise except as expressly authorized
pursuant to this Compact.” 194 From a facial reading, these two statements
remain ambiguous as to whether the state may tax non-Indian liquor
transactions in tribal gaming facilities. Of course, the Citizen Potawatomi
Nation recently won an arbitration award on this issue. But instead of
litigating or arbitrating195 the issue, the state and tribes could negotiate
which state taxes, if any, apply in this context through either cooperative

188. See Model Tribal Gaming Compact, 3A OKLA. STAT. § 281 (2011).
189. See, e.g., Tobacco Tax Compact Between the State of Oklahoma and the Absentee
Shawnee Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma (Okla. Sec’y of State No. 47739, Sept. 18, 2015),
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/filelog/90775.pdf [hereinafter Absentee Shawnee
Tobacco Compact].
190. See Hunting and Fishing Compact Between the State of Oklahoma and the
Cherokee Nation (Okla. Sec’y of State No. 47580, June 1, 2015), https://www.sos.ok.gov/
documents/filelog/90614.pdf.
191. Absentee Shawnee Tobacco Compact, supra note 189, at art. 2, § 6.
192. Id.
193. 3A OKLA. STAT. § 281 pt. 5(I) (2011).
194. Id. § 281 pt. 11(D).
195. The Model Tribal Gaming Compact requires arbitration before a suit can be filed in
federal court. Id. § 281 pt. 12(2).
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agreements, the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, or a
combination of both.
Oklahoma has a statutory scheme in place that may solve the issue of
state taxation of non-Indian liquor transactions in Indian country. To more
efficiently levy its taxes, Oklahoma adopted the Streamlined Sales and Use
Tax Administration Act. 196 This statute aims to alleviate the burdens of tax
compliance between states by using a central simplified system to apportion
state sales and use taxes. 197 The statute serves as a template agreement for
states—as separate sovereigns—to cooperate in the administration and
collection of their respective taxes. The statute, however, makes no
reference to tribes—the only sovereigns contemplated are other states and
the District of Columbia. 198 Courts have yet to consider tribal inclusion in
the scheme and few Oklahoma cases address the Streamlined Sales and Use
Tax Administration Act.199 NCAI advocates for the inclusion of tribes in
the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, yet efforts to include tribes
in the scheme have yet to gain widespread acceptance. 200 Tribal inclusion
could prove enormously beneficial in Oklahoma, where thirty-eight
sovereign tribal governments exist.
North Dakota has entered into sales and use tax agreements with tribes
located within its borders. 201 Chapter 57-39.8, titled “State-Tribal Sales,
Use, and Gross Receipts Tax Agreements,” grants the governor the
authority to enter agreements “relating to administration and allocation of
state and tribal sales, use, and gross receipts taxes.” 202 These agreements
allow tribes and the state to work out tax allocation on their own terms,
instead of having their rights determined through litigation. Further, tribes
and the state may enter into general tax agreements, such as the Streamlined
Sales and Use Tax Agreement, and then specifically compact for certain

196. 68 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1354.14-1377 (2011).
197. Id. § 1354.18.
198. Id. § 1354.15(12).
199. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2014 OK 95, 341 P.3d 56 (holding
that the Streamlined Act contained an exception for purchases of electricity and natural gas
utility services); see also City of Tulsa v. State, 2012 OK 47, 278 P.3d 602 (mentioning the
Streamlined Act in a footnote).
200. See Nat'l Cong. Of Am. Indians [NCAI], Relationship Between Tribal Governments
and the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, Res. GBW-05-028 (June 12-15, 2005),
http://www.ncai.org/attachments/Resolution_lPFkSFtsxQhOxSVbIExyTLYzvpRTaNthUN
URQEYNrTuVPkWvjYK_GBW-05-028_SSTP_Resolution.pdf.
201. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-39.8-01 (Supp. 2015).
202. Id.
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taxes (tobacco, alcohol, etc.) in which the state may possess an increased
regulatory interest separate from purely raising revenue.
VI. Tribes Should Accept Dram-Shop Liability for Liquor Sales
in Indian Country as an Exertion of Sovereignty
As discussed above, courts have interpreted § 1161 to mean that states
may, at the very least, require tribes or individuals selling liquor in Indian
country to obtain state liquor licenses. Tribes, however, remain generally
shielded from tort liability arising out of liquor transactions in Indian
country by virtue of sovereign immunity. This presents a problem for
consumers in Indian country and for those living near Indian country, which
constitutes a significant population given the patchwork of Indian country
in Oklahoma. Tribes can address this issue by enacting tribal tort claim acts
or through other remedial measures.
Dram-shop liability is defined as “[c]ivil liability of a commercial seller
of alcoholic beverages for personal injury caused by an intoxicated
customer.” 203 Tort claimants alleging injuries arising out of liquor
transactions in Indian country have argued that § 1161 grants courts
jurisdiction over tribes in this context. Courts, however, have generally
construed § 1161 narrowly in these cases, finding that the statute does not
waive tribal sovereign immunity. 204 Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe Indians of
Florida 205 illustrates a narrow construction of § 1161 and Rice in the
context of a tribe’s dram-shop liability. In Furry, a father brought a
wrongful death suit against the tribe, claiming that his daughter died from
being over-served by a tribal entity. 206 The father argued that the tribe’s
application for a state liquor license “amounted to a broad agreement to be
bound by Florida law in all respects.” 207 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed,
clarifying that the narrow Rice holding only addressed California’s ability
to require liquor licensing. 208 Thus, the court held that the tribe had not
expressly waived its sovereign immunity and could not be sued for dramshop liability as a result of possessing a liquor license.209
Oklahoma recently addressed the issue of tribal dram-shop liability in
Sheffer v. Buffalo Run Casino, PTE, Inc. and held that (1) the tribe was
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Dram-Shop Liability, supra note 14.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 10, § 7.05[1][b], at 639-40.
685 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1226.
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1230.
Id. at 1236-37.
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immune from suit in state court for compact-based torts claims and (2) the
tribe did not waive its sovereign immunity by obtaining a liquor license. 210
The court noted that the Rice holding was “very narrow” and “limited to a
regulatory jurisdictional analysis.” 211 Consequently, the court held that
Oklahoma’s regulatory power under § 1161 did not extend to a private
party’s tort claim against a tribe. 212 Furthermore, the court explained,
“applying for and accepting a state liquor license ‘is nothing more than a
promise to comply with state liquor laws.’” 213 Other state courts have
similarly held that obtaining a liquor license does not abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity, 214 although at least one state supreme court has
determined that a state can require that tribes obtain dram-shop insurance
before a liquor license may be granted and that procuring insurance
constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity. 215
While at first blush these cases seem to be explicit tribal victories, they
highlight a central problem: a class of tort victims may have no remedy (or,
perhaps more accurately, may not have the best remedy). The cases
upholding sovereign immunity were correctly decided and tribes have no
existing legal duty to adopt tort claim statutes or provide a remedy in these
situations. But, in terms of asserting sovereignty, such a move may prove
beneficial.
Similar to the taxation context, some compacts explicitly address tort
liability. For example, Part 6 of Oklahoma’s Model Tribal Gaming
Compact addresses tort claims and limited consent to suit. 216 The compact
requires that tribal enterprises maintain tort liability insurance of not less
than $250,000 for any one person, $2,000,000 “for any one occurrence for
210. 2013 OK 77, ¶ 50, 315 P.3d 359, 373.
211. Id. ¶¶ 37, 40, 315 P.3d at 369-70 (emphasis omitted).
212. Id. ¶ 43, 315 P.3d at 371.
213. Id. ¶ 45, 315 P.3d at 371 (quoting Bittle v. Bahe, 2008 OK 10, ¶ 36, 192 P.3d 810,
836 (Kauger, J., dissenting)).
214. See, e.g., Foxworthy v. Puyallup Tribe of Indians Ass’n, 169 P.3d 53, 59 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2007) (“The Puyallup Tribe has not waived its sovereign immunity to private lawsuits
in state court. Nor has Congress chosen to abrogate tribal immunity in private dram shop
actions . . . .”); see also Filer v. Tohono O’Odham Nation Gaming Enter., 129 P.3d 78, 84
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (“The Court in Rice certainly did not hold that California, let alone a
private citizen, could sue the tribe in state court, despite a claim of sovereign immunity, if
the action had some connection to the state's regulation of alcohol.”); Holguin v. Ysleta Del
Sur Pueblo, 954 S.W.2d 843, 854 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (“We cannot conclude, however, that
tribal sovereign immunity is waived for a private suit brought under the Texas Dram Shop
Act.”).
215. See Ex parte Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 155 So. 3d 224, 230-31 (Ala. 2014).
216. 3A OKLA. STAT. § 281 pt. 6 (2011).
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personal injury,” and $1,000,000 “for any one occurrence for property
damage.” 217 Similar to a governmental tort claims act, the compact requires
tribal enterprises to first review a tort claim and make a determination
whether to resolve the claim. 218 A claimant may only bring suit after the
tribal enterprise reviews and decides not to resolve the claim. 219 And this
provision only applies to “patrons,” which is defined as “any person who is
on the premises of a gaming facility, for the purpose of playing covered
games authorized by this Compact.” 220 Thus, in order to file a compact tort
claim, the claimant must have been at the casino with the purpose of
gambling.
Keeping in mind the Model Compact definition of patron, consider this
hypothetical: a casino patron becomes intoxicated at a tribal casino, then
drives away and hits a driver on a state highway. If that driver is injured in
the wreck, damages may only be recovered from the drunken-driver and not
from the gaming facility, because the injured drivers would not fit within
the definition of “patron.” And, of course, the result would not be the same
if the drunken-driver had been over-served at a local bar governed by state
law. So while gaming compacts may cover some liquor transactions (and
the possible dram-shop liability) in Indian country, they fall far short of
comprehensive. Moreover, a tribe may operate restaurants or convenience
stores not covered by the compact. Tribes can cover these facilities by
enacting tribal tort claim statutes. Tribal tort claim acts could also extend to
gaming facilities and provide remedies for non-patrons who may be injured
by dram-shop torts.
Adoption of a tort claim act gives tribes both internal and external
legitimacy. Internally, tribal members who may be victims of torts arising
out of tribal liquor transactions (or other torts) would benefit from an
explicit statutory remedy. Externally, such a measure would grant nonIndians (and non-patrons) specific protections and would encourage the use
of tribal courts. On a practical level, adopting tort claim acts could deter
future litigation on the issue. In Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community,
the Supreme Court hinted that a future case (with the right facts) might
warrant a reevaluation of sovereign immunity in a way that would affect the
non-patron issue discussed above. 221 There, the Court noted that it has not
“specifically addressed (nor, so far as we are aware, has Congress) whether
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at pt. 6(A)(1).
Id. at pt. 6(A)(8).
Id. at pt. 6(A)(9).
Id. at pt. 3(20).
134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 n.8 (2014).
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immunity should apply in the ordinary way if a tort victim, or other plaintiff
who has not chosen to deal with a tribe, has no alternative way to obtain
relief for off-reservation commercial conduct.” 222 Further, assuming dramshop liability could vitiate Oklahoma’s possible argument that tribes remain
incapable or unwilling to legitimately regulate liquor within their Indian
country. This argument has been raised in Parker, with Nebraska claiming
that the tribe simply sought to gain revenue as opposed to instituting a
comprehensive regulatory plan.223
In terms of economic development, outside investors and customers
would likely be more attracted to conduct business with tribal entities with
a more solid legal framework in place.224 These concerns have prompted
some tribes to adopt statutory provisions similar to Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. While tort claim acts present some obvious benefits, one
legitimate downside is cost. Tribes must be willing to pay for tort liability
arising out of alcohol transactions. Several tribes have mitigated this
financial risk by taking out insurance policies on future liability and, in
certain contexts, tribes may be bound by compacts to require such
insurance. 225 Tribes may also place a statutory cap on damages recoverable
directly from the tribe in these cases. The Absentee Shawnee Tribe of
Indians of Oklahoma adopted this approach in its Tort Claim Act, expressly
prohibiting awards of exemplary or punitive damages. 226 Other tribes,
including the Mississippi Band of Choctaws, have enacted similar statutes
requiring tort claimants to file a claim notice with the tribe’s attorney
general within one year of the alleged tortious act.227 The attorney general

222. Id.
223. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 98, at 52.
224. Robert J. Miller, American Indian Entrepreneurs: Unique Challenges, Unlimited
Potential, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1297, 1309 (2008) (“In the modern day, many tribal
governments and reservations are not considered business friendly locations. This is not
necessarily because they are anti-business, but because they often have not yet enacted the
laws and regulatory codes considered crucial for the success of business and for attracting
new businesses and investments.”).
225. See 3A OKLA. STAT. § 281 pt. 6(A)(1) (2011) (“During the term of this Compact,
the enterprise shall maintain public liability insurance for the express purposes of covering
and satisfying tort claims.”).
226. Absentee Shawnee Governmental Tort Claims Act § 7(B) (2010) (“No award for
damages in an action or any claim against the Tribe shall include punitive or exemplary
damages.”).
227. See MISS. BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS TRIBAL CODE § 25-1-6(3) (2015), http://
www.choctaw.org/government/tribal_code/Title%2025%20-%20Choctaw%20Torts%20
Claim%20Act.pdf.
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then has six months to evaluate the claim. 228 The statute also grants the
tribal chief and the secretary/treasurer to settle any tort claim up to a
specified statutory amount. 229 These approaches clearly define the rights of
customers making alcohol transactions in Indian country and those who
suffer torts because of those transactions. Further, these acts are exercises
of sovereignty and manifest tribes’ willingness to regulate alcohol within
their Indian country.
VII. Fixing the Section 1161 Problem
Though the prospect of spurring Congress to action seems daunting, the
exercise of fixing the statutory language is straightforward. Recall the
statutory language:
The provisions of section 1154, 1156, 3113, 3488, and 3669, of
this title, shall not apply within any area that is not Indian
country, nor to any act or transaction within any area of Indian
country provided such act or transaction is in conformity both
with the laws of the State in which such act or transaction occurs
and with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having
jurisdiction over such area of Indian country, certified by the
Secretary of the Interior, and published in the Federal
Register. 230
First, the language “both with the laws of the State in which such act or
transaction occurs and” should be deleted, removing the regulatory
authority delegated to states.
Next, Congress should add language recognizing tribal inherent
authority, as opposed to delegated authority, to regulate liquor within Indian
country. The Supreme Court case of Duro v. Reina231 and the subsequent
“Duro fix” illustrate the need for inherent authority language. In Duro, the
Court held that tribes lack inherent authority to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. 232 In response to the Duro decision,
Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”) to reflect “the
inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. § 25-1-6(1).
Id. § 25-1-7(3).
18 U.S.C. § 1161 (2012).
495 U.S. 676 (1990).
Id. at 698.
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criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.” 233 This legislative move was coined
as the “Duro fix.” 234 The Supreme Court subsequently validated the Duro
fix in U.S. v. Lara, admitting that “the Constitution authorizes Congress to
permit tribes, as an exercise of their inherent tribal authority, to prosecute
nonmember Indians.” 235
To clarify the Duro fix, consider the following illustration. Tribal
sovereignty should not be considered as a rock that cannot be restored once
chipped away. Instead, tribal sovereignty should be considered as an
inflated balloon: although the balloon may be compressed, the balloon
expands upon removal of the compression. Congressional solutions such as
the Duro fix can remove such compression on tribal sovereignty.
Inherent authority language is necessary in § 1161. Recall the Supreme
Court’s language in Rice: “There can be no doubt that Congress has
divested the Indians of any inherent power to regulate [alcohol].”236 In
Mazurie and Rice, the Court looked to congressional delegation or
divestiture of authority in the alcohol regulation context.237 Using the Duro
fix to recognize inherent authority in this context ensures that courts
reviewing an amended § 1161 will not undermine tribal authority on
congressional delegation or divestiture grounds.
Other legal commentators have noted the need for congressional
recognition of tribal inherent sovereignty in this context. 238 For example,
the Supreme Court’s decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Government made federal statutes concerning Indian country (including §
1161) generally inapplicable to Alaska Natives.239 As a result, as to Alaska
Natives, it has been argued that § 1161 should be amended to reflect
inherent tribal sovereignty, which “would ensure that Alaska Native tribes
have the authority to regulate alcohol transactions and consumption by
tribal members residing in the village and would remove the risks and

233. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012); see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215-16
(2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing Congress’s amendment of the Indian Civil
Rights Act in response to Duro).
234. Lara, 541 U.S. at 216 (Thomas, J. concurring).
235. Id. at 210 (majority opinion).
236. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 724 (1983).
237. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975); Rice, 463 U.S. at 734-35.
238. See, e.g., Catherine E. Polta, Tribal Jurisdiction over Social and Minor Crimes: The
Only Feasible Resolution for Institutional Racism in Alaskan Criminal Law Enforcement, 6
GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 273 (2014).
239. 522 U.S. 520, 534 (1998).
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administrative burden of litigation to explore the scope of inherent tribal
sovereignty.” 240
In addition to recognizing tribal inherent sovereignty, Congress should
retain the federal statutory prohibition of alcohol in Indian country (§§
1154, 1156, 3113, 3488, and 3669). Of course, once a tribe acts on its
inherent sovereignty and adopts an ordinance, the federal prohibition
disappears from Indian country under that tribe’s jurisdiction. Keeping the
federal prohibition ensures a default law applies to alcohol in Indian
country in the event that a tribe chooses not to act. Additionally, the
requirement of certification by the Secretary of the Interior and publication
in the Federal Register should be kept if not only for the purpose of
notifying government actors—both federal and local—and the public that
federal prohibition of alcohol in that area of Indian country no longer
applies.
Considering all of these issues, the statutory rewrite could be as simple
as this:
The provisions of sections 1154, 1156, 3113, 3488, and 3669, of
this title, shall not apply within any area that is not Indian
country, nor to any act or transaction within any area of Indian
country provided such act or transaction is in conformity with an
ordinance duly adopted by the tribe, in exercise of its inherent
sovereignty to regulate alcohol and having jurisdiction over
such area of Indian country, certified by the Secretary of the
Interior, and published in the Federal Register. (emphasis added
to proposed language).
Through such a revision, tribes would be able to regulate liquor in their
jurisdiction without having to genuflect to state law.
VIII. Conclusion
The strained relationship between Oklahoma and tribes can be seen by
looking at the amount of past litigation between the parties (not to mention
the contentious history more generally). As for alcohol regulation in Indian
country, many issues remain on the horizon as this article seeks to point
out. Instead of solely relying on judges to craft piecemeal solutions (or
perhaps piecemeal confusions) to questions of regulatory authority over
alcohol, Congress should revisit a main source of these problems: 18 U.S.C.

240. Polta, supra note 238, at 283.
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§ 1161. Put simply, § 1161 remains as a relic of the Termination Era and
conflicts with Congress’s current policy of self-determination.
Many tribes perform significant governmental functions such as
environmental regulation and healthcare provision. Moreover, tribes in
Oklahoma have already exhibited the specific ability and willingness to
regulate liquor within their own jurisdictions. For example, the Chickasaw
Nation devotes an entire chapter of its code to alcohol, stating that “it is
necessary to adopt strict controls over the operation of certain beverage
sales conducted in Indian Country which is under the jurisdiction of the
Chickasaw Nation.” 241 The regulation of alcohol should no longer
contradict the general rule that tribes possess the inherent sovereignty to
make their own laws and be governed by them.
Ryan Wilson

241. CHICKASAW NATION CODE §§ 3-201.1-201.12 (2015), https://www.chickasaw.net/
Documents/Long-Term/Chickasaw-Code/Title-03.aspx.
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